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Preface
The issue of Arab reform has been brought to the fore of discussion in the after-
math of the September 11 attacks, and further intensified by the transatlantic
debates which followed the Iraq war. In stark contrast with the ‘benign neglect’
and active support towards authoritarian governments of preceding decades,
Arab reform in the West is now seen as a vital security interest and the main
antidote to Islamist terrorism. Heightened concern with the democratic deficien-
cies of the region has given rise to a plethora of initiatives on both sides of the
Atlantic. The US Greater Middle East Initiative, the “Partnership for Progress
and a Common Future” launched by the Group of Eight (G8) in June 2004, EU-
US summits, together with European programmes towards the Mediterranean
and wider Middle East all attest to a commitment to reform.
Such developments have also sparked off debate on how best to implement the
enhanced focus on reform. Recent initiatives have reflected transatlantic consen-
sus on the sequencing of reform, where – despite differences in approach –
emphasis is laid on the strengthening of civil society as a motor of reform and,
more generally, on a gradual bottom-up approach. However, the apparent con-
vergence in policy circles on the merits of gradual change has been increasingly
challenged by experts of democratization processes on both sides of the Atlantic.
The role of civil society as a motor of reform is increasingly contested, while
cooperation with governments of the region has proved of limited relevance,
especially in the post 9/11 context. Attention has thus focused on the need to
target political institutions and other actors in the political arena as a comple-
ment to existing approaches.1
In light of these developments, it is important to assess whether Western (partic-
ularly European Union) policies have a significant role to play in Arab reform.
To what extent do existing and intended policies provide a window of opportu-
nity to enhance reform? What to make of transatlantic cooperation? Does this
call for a fundamental revision of EU strategies, or should EU approaches
merely be improved? Although the focus shall be on European Union action,
reference shall be made to initiatives external to the EU in so far as they affect
and raise questions about EU policy (initiatives such as GMEI and NATO).
1. D. Brumberg, ‘Liberalization versus Democracy: understanding Arab political reform’, Working
Paper 37, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003; A. Hawthorne, ‘Middle Eastern
Democracy: Is Civil Society the Answer?’, Carnegie Papers No. 44, March 2004; R. Youngs,
‘Europe’s uncertain pursuit of Middle East reform’, Carnegie Papers No. 45, June 2004.
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This paper outlines the rationale behind European democracy promotion poli-
cies in the Arab region. It reviews European policies implemented in the area
since the 1990s, and, after assessing them, concludes by suggesting ways in
which to enhance European strategies of reform. It will argue that while the
comprehensive approach underlying EU policies, from the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership and the European Security Strategy to Wider Europe, provides an
appropriate framework to tackle the problems of the region, EU policies need
revision to be successful. In particular, EU policy should address the Islamist
dimension of Arab civil societies and enhance the use of conditionality. That
said, since genuine reform must ultimately come from within Arab societies,
there are limits to what any external policy of reform can achieve. Nevertheless,
external actors can and must certainly help in the process.
Irene MENENDEZ GONZALEZ
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1. Reform: a (new) imperative?
The discussion on and commitment to reform in the Arab world is not new.2
Arab experience of liberalism dates to the constitutionalist period under Otto-
man rule (1870s-1910s), followed by a period of parliamentarism under colo-
nial dominance (1920s-1950s), and culminating in the wave of political liberal-
ization – ripples of the so-called ‘third wave’ – which spread, albeit unequally,
throughout the region in the 1980s. Thus, several Arab countries, including
Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan, embarked on a number of political and economic
reforms during the period in what was seen as evidence of a transition to democ-
racy, today largely stalled.
Equally long-standing is the debate on democracy in the Arab/Muslim world.
Long regarded as the ‘democratic exception’ in academic circles, the discussion
on Arab reform has been broadly divided between culturalist and counter-cul-
turalist arguments on the reasons for the absence of democracy and whether it
can emerge. Advocates of the culturalist thesis point out to a fundamental
incompatibility between democracy and Islamic culture, the latter’s features
making it impermeable to democratizing influences. Among these are an aver-
sion to rational thinking (a prerequisite to modernization), the priority of faith
over reason, the emphasis on community at the expense of the individual and
the fusion of public and private, temporal and spiritual spheres.3
Widely criticised for its ahistorical and undifferentiated view of modernity and
democracy, the culturalist or Orientalist interpretation has been countered by
the ‘contingent’ or neo Thirdworldist view, which sees the absence of democracy
as a reflection of worsening socio-economic conditions suffered by Arab peoples
under years of Western-supported autocratic government.4 Emphasising the
existence of democratic elements in Islamic-Arab political culture and institu-
tions, such views maintain that democracy could eventually develop under given
2. A. Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, London, Faber and Faber, 1992.
3. B. Lewis, ‘The Roots of Muslim Rage’, Atlantic Monthly, September 1990, 266:3, pp. 47-60; S.
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, NewYork, Simon and
Schuster, 1996.
4. J. Esposito, J.L. Piscatori, ‘Democratization and Islam’, Middle East Journal, Summer 1991,
45:3, pp. 427-440; G. Martin-Munoz, ‘Political Reform and Social Change in the Maghreb’, in
A.Vasconcelos and G. Joffé (eds.), The Barcelona Process, Building a Euro-Mediterranean
Regional Community, London, Frank Cass, 2000.
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conditions.5 This has led some analysts to see the broadening of political partic-
ipation as evidence of democratization, especially concerning developments
within civil society. Among them is Saad Eddin Ibrahim’s conviction that the
prospects of liberal democracy in the region have never been so bright.
6 
In this perspective, the reasons for the persistence of authoritarianism range
from the existence of ‘rentier states’, largely untouched by local pressures for
democratization, socio-economic underdevelopment and political culture, to
external factors such as regional conflict (exacerbating the sense of regional
insecurity and thus hindering any move towards openness), foreign dominance
and Western support for autocratic regimes.7
Neither has the EU ‘discovered’ the need for long-term democratization in the
region after ‘9/11’.
8 Democracy promotion policies has been a longstanding
objective of the EU, and a product of moral and strategic imperatives. The very
nature of the EU as a grand peace project through integration, together with the
gradual move beyond mere economic integration towards a ‘Community of val-
ues’, have encouraged the development of a range of policies to promote democ-
ratization. In addition, the EU’s military weakness has pushed it to become a
‘civilian superpower’, aiming to promote stability through economic develop-
ment and trade, democracy, good governance and the rule of law. North Africa
and the broader Muslim world in particular have long been a challenge to
Europe, not least because of geographical proximity. Long regarded as an area
of prime strategic interest, the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries are
also ridden with potential instability and conflict. The importance of the region
to Europe has grown through successive processes of EC enlargement and Euro-
pean East-West reunification, a process which has led the EU to pay more atten-
tion to its neighbouring countries.9
However, the debate on Arab reform has gained momentum in the post 9/11
period through a combination of developments. Outside the Arab world, the
commitment to reform has been enhanced by the link commonly made in West-
5. A variant of the culturalist argument explains the incompatibility of democracy with political
Islam as historical, not inherent. Like the contingent thesis, such historical interpretation leaves
room for change under certain conditions. See Lewis, in What Went Wrong? Western Impact and
Middle Eastern Response, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002.
6. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, ‘An Open Door’, Wilson Quarterly, Spring 2004.
7. May Chartouni-Dubarry, ‘Political Transition in the Middle East’, in A.Vasconcelos and G. Joffé
(eds.); B. Ghalioun, ‘The persistence of Arab authoritarianism’, Journal of Democracy, Oct. 2004,
15:4, pp. 126-132.
8. V. Perthes, ‘America’s « Greater Middle East » and Europe: key issues for dialogue’, Middle East
Policy, Autumn 2004, 11:3.
9. Gillespie and Youngs (eds.), European Union and Democracy Promotion: the case of North
Africa, London, Frank Cass, 2002, p. 204.
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ern policy circles between democratization and Western security concerns. The
roots of instability and extremism are increasingly thought to be the product of
the absence of democratization and modernization across the region.10 Pressure
for reform has been exacerbated by the US invasion and subsequent occupation
of Iraq, exposing Arab governments to charges of incompetence from their citi-
zenry and intensifying expressions of discontent with the status quo. Inside the
Arab world, the realization by governments in the region that security measures
would not suffice to counter radicalism and terrorism has prompted some Arab
governments to carry out reform measures in the immediate aftermath of 9/11
– although such reforms were more likely prompted by a desire to project a more
benign image abroad than by the acknowledgement of domestic repression as a
cause of extremism.
Beyond such reactions, the discussion on reform was given greater impulse with
the publication of the United Nations Development Programme’s 2002 Arab
Human Development Report. The Report enhanced the legitimacy of reform as
an urgent pan-Arab issue. Openly critical of Arab governments, it denounced
the deficits in education, good governance, freedom and women’s empowerment
across the Arab world and identified political and economic reform as crucial to
dealing with the deep crises (economic, political, cultural and social) besetting
the region. Particularly relevant was the increased emphasis on the political
dimension of development. In contrast with earlier UNDP reports, a whole
chapter was devoted to the issue of ‘governance’ (Chapter 7), followed by spe-
cific recommendations on institutional reform. These included strengthening
legislatures, making the executive more accountable, introducing mechanisms
for the alternation of power, independent judiciaries and freedom of association.
The Report also introduced a distinction between economic growth and ‘devel-
opment’, henceforth defined more broadly. Development was defined in terms
of building, using and ‘liberating’ human capabilities. The former two involved
improving health and environmental, educational and economic reform, while
the latter called for increasing political freedom through greater political reform.
Political reform was thus not only seen as a condition of economic and social
development, but also as a goal of development. Lastly, the credibility of the
Report derived from the fact that it was authored by Arab academics, thus pro-
viding an insider’s look at the region’s problems of development. Although con-
tested within the Arab world, the Report nevertheless highlighted the urgency of
reform and triggered discussion on how best to implement it.
10. Although the link between terrorism and the absence of democracy is simplistic and has been
denounced elsewhere; see, International Crisis Group, ‘Islamism in North Africa (I): the legacies of
history’, Middle East and North Africa Briefing, April 2004.
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2. Political Reform in the Arab World: 
towards what kind of democracy?
2.1 The meaning of ‘reform’
The emerging consensus on the need for reform, both in the region and among
Western policy circles, has not been met by similar agreement on what political
‘reform’ means. The literature on the meaning of democracy and democratiza-
tion is broad and subject to debate, not least because the very term ‘democracy’
is dynamic and a reflection of historical context.11 Taken to mean ‘democratiza-
tion’, ‘reform’ is largely defined as the process of transformation of the political
system from non-democracy towards accountable and representative govern-
ment. A distinction is made between phases of transition, or the initial phase in
which democracy is not assured, and consolidation, in which democracy
becomes ‘the only game in town’.12 From a political science perspective, democ-
racy has been understood as a continuum from a minimalist to a maximalist
position. At one end of the spectrum are those who insist on a minimal or formal
conception of democracy, in line with Schumpeterian assumptions. On the
other, are those who argue that democracy is not just about procedures for gov-
ernment but also about substantive rights. As captured by Kaldor and Vejvoda,
“Formal democracy is a set of rules, procedures and institutions… Sub-
stantive democracy [is] a process that has to be continually reproduced,
a way of regulating power relations in such a way as to maximise the
opportunities for individuals to influence the conditions in which they
live, to participate in and influence debates about the key decisions which
affect society.”13
Thus, the former sees democracy as the regular holding of free elections and the
introduction of basic norms (absence of intimidation, party competition, inclu-
sive suffrage) that make free elections possible. A slightly more inclusive defini-
tion emphasises the introduction of liberal individual rights (freedom of assem-
bly, religious freedom, free press, etc.), while a truly ‘substantive’ definition
views democratization as ‘the introduction and extension of citizen rights and
the creation of a democratic state’.14
11. A definition of democracy has not been codified in international law. See Karen Smith, EU For-
eign Policy in a Changing World, 2004.
12. J. Linz and A. Stepan, Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: South Europe,
South America and Post-communist Europe, Baltimore, John Hopkins University, 1996, p. 5.
13. M. Kaldor and I. Vejvoda, ‘Democratization in Central and East European Countries’, Interna-
tional Affairs, 1997, 73:1, p. 67.
14. J. Grugel, Democratization: A Critical Introduction, New York, Palgrave, 2002, p. 5.
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However, while not necessarily the ‘best’ kind of democracy, this paper shall put
forward a definition of political democracy which provides a concrete set of
criteria against which to assess reform. One such definition of democracy is that
advanced by Dahl. At the core of ‘polyarchy’, or political democracy, as defined
by Dahl is responsive government – to the preferences of its citizens. Broadly,
such responsiveness requires that citizens be able to formulate preferences, indi-
cate their preferences to fellow citizens and government by collective and indi-
vidual action, and ensure that such preferences weigh equally in the conduct of
government. These requirements in turn translate into a series of institutional
guarantees, amongst which are: freedom to form and join organizations; free-
dom of expression; right to vote; eligibility for public office; right of political
leaders to compete for support, as well as for votes; alternative sources of infor-
mation; free and fair elections, and institutions for making government policies
depend on votes and other expressions of preferences.15
2.2 Reform in the Arab world: who to talk to?
The new focus on democracy has also triggered debate about how best to imple-
ment reform. The past few years have witnessed a growing consensus on the
limited democratic potential of bottom-up approaches. It has been observed that
while some change did indeed take place in Arab regimes, it amounted largely
to a ‘modernization of authoritarianism’ triggered by fiscal pressures and legit-
imacy crises. This has resulted in the emergence of ‘liberalized autocracies’, or
states that tolerate or even promote a measure of reform enough to meet mini-
mal demands for change from within but insufficient to allow mainstream polit-
ical groups to challenge rulers’ political power – a way to blow off steam.16 It is
the presence of entrenched elites of such ‘liberalized autocracies’ that is hailed
as a new and powerful obstacle to reform, in addition to existing ones. Moreo-
ver, and contrary to the belief that underpinned policy during the 1990s – that
partial liberalization outside core political institutions would produce a bottom-
up pressure capable of spilling over into formal democracy – it is now increas-
ingly argued that a focus on civil society and other non-governmental actors is
at best neutral and at worst counterproductive for reform.
17 Arguably, such
groups are often apolitical and support the status quo, doing little to challenge
established political distribution of power in authoritarian regimes.
15. R. Dahl, Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press,
1971, p. 3.
16. R. Aliboni and L. Guazzone, ‘Democracy in the Arab Countries and the West’, Mediterranean
Politics, Spring 2004, 9:1, p. 83.
17. G. Salamé (ed.), Democracy without Democrats? The renewal of politics in the Muslim world,
London, Tauris, 2001; Op.cit. D. Brumberg.
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According to prevailing analyses, Arab civil society does not fulfil a number of
criteria necessary to enhance its democratization role. First, civil society sectors
are not sufficiently autonomous for the development of a pro-democratic move-
ment. Most civil society actors (labour unions, chambers of commerce and the
NGO sector) rely on close economic and personal ties with government officials
and are reluctant to take any action which jeopardizes these ties. Secondly, most
civil society organizations lack a clear pro-democracy agenda, which prevents
them from mobilizing large numbers of citizens. Beyond the fact that they are
financially and administratively linked to the state, the mission of most NGOs
is to provide services and socio-economic development necessary to maintain
social stability, while that of professional organisations such as chambers of
commerce and labour unions is to serve their members – not to challenge polit-
ical systems. This is in sharp contrast with service NGOs and community groups
in South Africa and many Latin American countries which had a double agenda
of development and promoting political change, and could thus mobilize sup-
port for both ends. Islamic organisations have traditionally shown ambivalent
attitudes towards democracy, while sectors with a clear pro-democracy agenda
such as pro-democracy NGOs are associated with the liberal secular elite and
thus unable of mobilizing the so-called Arab street.
As one analyst has argued, ‘Democratization requires, among other things, an
opening at the higher level of political institutions, contestation for national
office and expanded political liberties. These changes cannot be brought about
by small numbers of citizens working to improve neighbourhood garbage col-
lection’.18 This is not to say that civil society is not important in the promotion
of reform. Due to its role in the promotion of pluralism, civil society is an impor-
tant social and economic factor. However, political reform requires dialogue and
cooperation with actors in the political arena. Such reasoning does not exclude
dialogue with governments. It merely calls for dialogue with political actors
other than government elites.
The question that arises then is whether there are parties or opposition groups
operating at the political level that are liberal/democratic in character, and will-
ing to push for pluralistic politics. Western policy in the last decades has been
based on the assumption that religious political parties and opposition groups
throughout the Arab world were inherently authoritarian and anti-Western.
However, this perception is blatantly simplistic. Far from being monolithic, the
debate on reform in the Arab world is currently divided. In addition, and within
the Islamic movement, currents of reform exist which seek to adapt Islam to the
challenges of modernity and change through religious reinterpretation.
18. Op.cit. A. Hawthorne, p. 18.
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Radical Islamism aside, most analyses have identified three broad perspectives.
The liberal democratic outlook defines reform as the process needed to establish
secular, Western-style democratic states. Democracy and human rights are seen
as universal concepts and reflect shared values. Advocated by intellectuals, jour-
nalists, human rights and democracy activists and members of secular opposi-
tion parties – many educated in the West – the liberal view calls for Arab rulers
to submit to constitutional restrictions, to the will of the people in free and fair
elections and to term limits. They also demand abrogating emergency laws and
security courts, ending state control over media, ending restrictions on political
parties and civic organizations and establishing independent judiciaries. How-
ever, such Western-minded liberals are associated with a small secular elite and
seen as subservient to the West, and have little or no influence over reform proc-
esses. A second perspective is that held by Arab nationalists. In their view, an
Islamic democracy is to be established within the Arab-Muslim world and in
opposition to any Western or alien democracy. It is envisaged as a ‘communitar-
ian’ or ‘ethnic’ democracy in which individual rights (especially those of women
and minorities) are subjected to community imperatives. However, particularly
when voiced by governments, it is argued, such discourse is often used to coun-
ter Western pressure to reform.
A third perspective on reform is that of mainstream moderate Islamist reform-
ers.
19 The term ‘moderate Islamism’ is a Western invention referring to those
Islamist movements that are peaceful and openly condemn violence, and advo-
cate forms of legal political participation, pluralism and rule of law.20 Moderate
Islamists vastly outweigh radical fundamentalist Islamists, and constitute the
main element of the Islamist movement in Arab civil societies. They include
political parties such as the Justice and Development Party and al-‘Adl wa-l-
Ihsan in Morocco,21 al-Nahda in Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan
(known as the Front of Islamic Action) and Hezbollah in Lebanon (Shiite and
not Sunni). In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has notably evolved into a peace-
ful, pro-democratic force which explicitly proclaims acceptance of pluralist
principles; the recently emerged Center Party (Hizb al-Wasat), a modernist
branch of the Brotherhood, calls for greater representation of women within the
party and the extension of membership to the Coptic Christian minority. Also
19. Islamism is understood here in its political mode: ‘Islamist movements’ are those which have
recourse to Islamic ideological references in their pursuit of political objectives. This encompasses
both radical and moderate movements.
20. See G. Martin Munoz, El Estado Arabe. Crisis de legitimidad y contestación islamista,
Barcelona, Edicions Bellaterra, 2000.
21. However, the latter have been more critical with the regime. It is thus not legalised, although
tolerated.
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significant is the public break between the Wahhabist movement and the Mus-
lim Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia over the intolerance of the former.
In Jordan and Morocco, mainstream Islamists have supported gradual, stability-
oriented processes of reform, seeking cohabitation instead of confrontation with
incumbent governments, and publicly rejecting violence as a means to attain
declared goals. Acceptance of democratic principles is also apparent in the will-
ingness to compromise shown by mainstream Islamists. Although many would
argue to the contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood in most Arab countries (Kuwait,
Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Yemen) seems to be working increasingly closely
with Arab nationalists and liberals on two key shared goals: liberalisation of
regimes in all Arab countries (which would strengthen the Brotherhood at the
polls) and an ‘anti-imperialist’ agenda in opposition to US interventionist poli-
cies in the Muslim world.22
These changes are reflected in the moderate Islamist discourse, marked by a
series of Islamic modernist currents of thought which attempt to reconcile cul-
ture and religion with a kind of Islamic democracy. Although demanding the
application of Islamic law (shari’a), Islamist moderates accept the need for it to
take account of contemporary social and economic realities, and thus advocate
an interpretation of Islamic law based on a rational reading (ijtihad) – Islamic
law has to be interpreted according to the individual believer’s rational interpre-
tation – and processes of deliberation in its elaboration. Although politically
costly, the experience of President Khatami’s reform movement in Iran shows
that there is a significant liberal wing within the reform movement largely sup-
ported by the young generations. Clearly, such reformist trends are far from the
Western-minded liberal secular reformers; although ‘moderate’, they defend
conservative positions on certain issues. Yet they depart from conservative
Islamism through their embrace of Islamic modernist ideas dating back to the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century reform movement.23
Obstacles
Despite its potential, engaging with moderate Islamist reformers presents a
number of difficulties. At a conceptual level, general assertions on the need for
an ‘Islamic democracy’ have not been followed by detailed ideas on what such
an Islamic democracy would look like, what political reform it would take and
22. Graham E. Fuller, ‘Islamists in the Arab World: The Dance Around Democracy’, Carnegie
Papers, No. 49, September 2004.
23. International Crisis Group, ‘Islamism in North Africa I: The legacies of History’, Middle East
and North Africa Briefing, April 2004.
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what institutional structures might combine religious and secular values. The
principle of shura is usually evoked as evidence of Islam’s democratic character.
Yet many others also see the shura council as an organ of deliberation, only
informally consulted by political leaders, and far from being an elected body
with formal powers. In addition, it has been observed that even moderate Islam-
ist reformers are ambivalent towards democracy. Arab intellectuals (both
nationalist and Islamist) continue to see the state as essential in the promotion
of the ‘grand causes’ of the Arab nation: Arab unity, social and economic devel-
opment, the application of the Shari’a, and the struggle against Israel and West-
ern imperialism. Many fear political reform, in its liberal variant, will under-
mine the state’s commanding position in society.24
More importantly, many Arab intellectuals, including Islamist reformers, con-
tinue to regard the West with suspicion and mistrust, attitudes which ultimately
hinder partnership-building. This rejection of Western intervention was made
evident by the overwhelmingly negative reaction which the 2002 Arab Human
Development Report provoked amongst Arab intellectuals in the region (both
secular and moderate Islamist).25 Such opposition to Western involvement as
exists among many Arab intellectuals (and perhaps the majority of the popula-
tion) is not new, and is related to a number of factors. Amongst them are: the
experience with Western colonialism, the establishment of the state of Israel
(with British and US backing) and the consistent support it has received from the
West, failure of Arab oil-exporting countries to maintain control over the price
of petrol since the 1970s, and US naval and military presence in the Persian Gulf
area since the 1980s. For Arab nationalists and moderate Islamists alike, West-
ern governments are either not really democratic or not interested in promoting
democracy in the Arab world for a mixture of economic and strategic reasons.
This feeling of mistrust towards the West has been exacerbated in the post 9/11
period. The war in Afghanistan, the lack of progress on the Arab-Israeli conflict
– and what is perceived as a timid reaction by the EU in the face of Israeli incur-
sions – and the recent US and UK invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq,
have intensified perceptions of Western intrusion and contributed to the rise of
anti-Western feelings across the Arab world. As captured by one senior official,
‘the Arab world does not mind American and European values, but it cannot
stand American policies, and by extension the same policies when embraced by
or tolerated by Europeans.”26 According to a survey carried out by Zogby Inter-
24. Sami E. Baroudi, ‘The 2002 Arab Human Development Report: Implications for Democracy’,
Middle East Policy, Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring 2004.
25. Ibid. p. 138
26. Commissioner Chris Patten, in his speech on ‘Islam and the West – at the Crossroads’ at the
Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, 24 May 2004.
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national of attitudes in eight countries (Egypt, Israel, Kuwait, Jordan, Lebanon,
Morocco, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia) highlighted a number of
pan-Arab issues of concern, foremost among which was the absence of peace in
the Middle East. Similar results have been emphasised by a Pew Research Centre
survey reflecting growing discontent with US policies in the Muslim world.27 In
addition, the recent embrace of authoritarian governments as allies in the war
against terrorism by the US and European governments alike has arguably
weakened moderate reformers within more open regimes such as Morocco by
creating an environment less conducive to accommodation with opposition
groups.28
At the level of government, such reluctance was clearly manifested in Egypt,
Saudi Arabia and Syria’s outright condemnation and rejection of the Greater
Middle East and North Africa Initiative as a Western attempt to impose change.
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s reaction was equally firm, referring in its
2004 Reform Initiative to the need to reject all foreign-generated reform plans
as interference in Egyptian affairs.
29
Engaging with moderate Islamist sectors of Arab civil society is an important
challenge subject to difficulties. Despite the uncertainty over the democratic
commitment of moderate Islamist sectors, the trend exists; it is in the interest of
European strategies to foster its potential. European strategies should aim to
extend dialogue with moderate Islamist reformers as a way of exploring possible
new channels of communication and restore its credibility in the Arab world.
27. Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Series, ‘A year after Iraq war’, March 16, 2004. Availa-
ble on http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=206
28. Alan Richards, ‘Modernity and Economic Development: The ‘New’ American Messianism’,
Middle East Policy, Vol. 10, No. 3, Fall 2003.
29. Op. cit. Hawthorne, p. 11.
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3. The EU as a democracy promoter: 
a modest record?
Against this backdrop, how to make Western policies more effective? Before
assessing European efforts of reform, it is necessary to outline both the rationale
behind policies of reform and the institutional capacities of which the EU
availed itself to promote reform.
3.1 The rationale and instruments
Western policies of reform in the 1990s have traditionally combined ethical and
pragmatic concerns. The end of the cold war ushered in a period of new norma-
tive thinking marked by the questioning of the moral underpinnings of the
West’s democratization agenda. In contrast to the emerging normative consen-
sus that sought to legitimise international intervention in the name of human
rights and social justice, discussion on democratization was increasingly marked
by arguments challenging the ethical legitimacy of Western democracy promo-
tion efforts.30 Fundamentally, however, Western and particularly European pol-
icies of reform were informed by the new theorizing on security that arose in the
aftermath of the cold war. Challenging prevailing understandings of security,
new theoretical approaches developed a more comprehensive concept of secu-
rity to deal with what was perceived as the changing nature of the security envi-
ronment. Questioning the traditional dominance of neo-realism and its empha-
sis on the military dimension of security, new approaches emphasised the nature
of security as multidimensional and interdependent. According to this view, sta-
bility and security were to be achieved by the gradual dismantling of the politi-
cal, social, economic and environmental causes of instability. Importantly, the
more states had to cope with the effects of political, social, economic and envi-
ronmental processes transcending national borders, the more they were forced
to develop policies based on cooperation.31 Such were the assumptions underly-
ing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, with its three-basket structure and
emphasis on cooperation. Thus, the EMP was based on the belief that economic
liberalization, political reform, cultural understanding and strategic stability
would be mutually reinforcing and complement each other to enhance well-
30. Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad, Notre Dame, Notre Dame
University Press, 1994; J. Baylis and Smith, The Globalization of World Politics, Oxford University
Press, 2004.
31. B. Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-
Cold War Era, 2nd edition, Lynne Rienner, 1991.
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being, stability and the EU’s own security.32 Such a comprehensive approach
was moreover consistent with the ‘contingent’ approach to political Islam,
which saw the persistence of authoritarianism less as an inherent feature of
Islamic culture than the product of the worsening socio-economic situation after
years of autocratic government. EU policies would henceforth seek to address
the social, economic roots of radical Islam so that political reform in due time
would not lead to radical Islamist responses.
In addition, EU policies were influenced by the assumptions of the democratic
peace thesis which gained widespread acceptance in the aftermath of the cold
war. Albeit disguised in idealistic terms, the external promotion of democracy
was in the utmost interest of the West:
“Starting from the observation that no two democracies have ever gone
to war with each other, a number of grounds could be advanced for
expecting the proliferation of democracy to lead to a more generally har-
monious international system. In balancing contending views, political
pluralism tended towards moderation. Governments held accountable to
their own populace would be encouraged to devote resources to social
and economic betterment rather than external aggression. Transparent
systems of governance would make the evolution of policies more pre-
dictable, while procedural checks and balances and the rule of law would
reduce the scope for arbitrary acts, undertaken with an autocrat’s per-
sonal prestige in mind.”33
Thus, democratization and security came to be seen as two sides of the same
coin. Lastly, and subject to debate, EU reform policy in the region was also
dictated by economic interests. For some, the EU agenda reflected the pressure
of transnational capital for a kind of ‘low intensity’ democracy; others empha-
sised the role of the private sector as a force behind reform, in which good gov-
ernance played a crucial role.34
Despite the new approach, however, EU policy in practice remained subjected to
a number of contradictions which significantly limited its effectiveness. Fore-
most among these was the underlying concern for stability in the region to the
detriment of genuine political change, or what one analyst has adequately
32. Rik Coolsaet and Sven Biscop, ‘A European Security Concept for the 21st Century’, Egmont
Papers, No. 1, Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, 2004.
33. Op. cit. Gillespie and Youngs, p. 8.
34. Ibid. p. 10, for a brief overview of the debate on the relationship between the democratization
agenda and Western economic interests.
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termed the ‘democratization-stabilization’ dilemma.35 As captured by Jüne-
mann, ‘for Europeans, democratization is less a goal in itself than a means of
attaining prioritized security goals’. 
Thus, as soon as security interests come into conflict with democratization
efforts – a likely probability in the process of political transition – the former is
likely to take precedence over the latter. In broad terms, the dilemma arguably
reflected a conflict between short-term and longer-term interests. While
increased pluralism was aimed at reducing migratory pressure in the long term,
too rapid a democratization process was likely to lead in the short term to polit-
ical turmoil or even civil war. Moreover, it could also bring Islamist parties to
power – as almost happened in Algeria in 1992. While the conflict between
democracy and stability is arguably a structural deficit of the Barcelona Process,
it has been exacerbated in the aftermath of September 11, since most Mediter-
ranean partners have become crucial allies in the fight against terrorism.
In addition to the democratization-stabilization dilemma, European reform pol-
icies have been tainted by more traditional caveats. A reflection of the EU’s sta-
tus as a ‘civilian power’, the gradualism underlying reform policies was also the
result of compromise between northern and southern member states in an
attempt to counterbalance diverging security interests – and did not necessarily
reflect a common view of the priorities towards the region.36 In light of their
proximity, southern member states have traditionally been more reluctant to
push for genuine reform due to the potentially destabilizing effects associated
with political change – an unwillingness which was highlighted by the desire to
exclude any references to democracy and conditionality in the initial Barcelona
Declaration. In contrast, northern states such as Britain and Germany have
pushed for a more stringent interpretation of the human rights clause embedded
in the association agreements.
Lastly, and from an interestingly refreshing perspective of discourse analysis,
one analyst has attempted to account for the contradictions inherent in the EU
approach to reform by pointing out the presence of two conflicting security
discourses – a ‘liberal reform discourse’ and a ‘cooperative security dis-
course’.37 Both discourses present different and conflicting meanings to what
the Mediterranean is, the security threats facing the EU and how these threats
35. Jünemann, ‘Security-building in the Mediterranean after September 11’, Mediterranean Poli-
tics, vol. 8, n° 2-3, summer-autumn 2003, Special issue on ‘Euro-Mediterranean relations after Sep-
tember 11’, p. 7.
36. Esther Barbé, ‘Balancing Europe’s Eastern and Southern Dimensions’, in J. Zielonka, Para-
doxes of European Foreign Policy, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998.
37. H. Malmvig, Cooperation or Democratization? The EU’s Conflicting Mediterranean Security
Discourses, Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Working Paper 2004/8, p. 3.
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should be tackled, with important consequences for the effective implementa-
tion of policy. In the cooperative security discourse, threats are presented as
‘challenges’ common to both the EU and Mediterranean partners, to be coun-
tered by concerted action and cooperation. Both sides of the Mediterranean
have an interest in cooperating, since security is indivisible. In addition, Medi-
terranean partners are articulated as different (the ‘other’), but equal partners
– cooperation is thus based on ‘due regard for the characteristics, values and
distinguishing features peculiar to each’.38 In contrast, the liberal reform dis-
course presents threats as deriving from the political and social problems of the
region, to be tackled by the promotion of democracy and liberal market
reform. In this perspective, it is the security of the EU that is the main object of
security, while the Southern Mediterranean is construed as different – unstable
and conflict-ridden – and inferior. Simultaneously, therefore, ‘the Mediterra-
nean is construed as a threat and as a partner, as an inferior and undeveloped
subject to be reformed, and as an equal partner with whom the EU shares secu-
rity perceptions and interests’.39
Both a cause and effect of such contradictions, the simultaneous presence of
two discourses has led the EU to ‘[waver] uneasily between different priorities
and logics in its Mediterranean policy’, and made implementation difficult. In
addition, however, such inconsistency in policy discourse may also partly
account for the mistrust and suspicion among Mediterranean partners about
the aims and motives of EU policy. The EMP is largely perceived as a security
arrangement designed by the EU to tackle a diffuse threat from the South, invo-
cations of partnership dismissed as rhetoric and political and economic liberal-
isation perceived as a way of undermining government control. Importantly,
such double-edged discourse continues to underlie recent programmes such as
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the European Security Strategy
(ESS). According to Malmvig, while both discourses are present to some extent
in both documents, the former is largely an expression of the liberal reform
discourse, while the latter is representative of cooperative security. In the ENP,
democracy, pluralism and human rights are ‘essential requisites for political
stability’, the Mediterranean region having a ‘history of autocratic and non-
democratic governance’ (COM (2003) 104 final: 7). In contrast, the ESS makes
reference to the ‘creation of a zone of peace, prosperity and progress through
partnership’, towards which ‘reforms cannot be imposed’ but must come from
within.
38. Barcelona Declaration, 1995.
39. Op.cit. Malmvig, p. 18.
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In terms of the instruments, the EU disposes of a number of tools to carry out
reform.40 Embodied in the 1991 Development Council Resolution, the commit-
ment to encourage reform in a systematic way was given visibility with the cre-
ation in 1994 of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
(EIDHR), led by the Commission, which grouped together projects from differ-
ent regions. Democracy assistance was further emphasised by the introduction
of a new democracy clause in 1995 affecting cooperation with third countries
and allowing for the use of political conditionality on recipient countries. The
measures envisaged range from political dialogue and diplomatic tools, such as
statements and the suspension of meetings at various levels of dialogue, to
changing the content of cooperation programmes or withdrawing aid, imposing
trade sanctions and suspending military or all cooperation.41 Within the institu-
tional framework of the EMP, the main tools are the Association Agreements
signed bilaterally between the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries.
Political dialogue at the highest level takes place at the Euro-Mediterranean
Ministerial Conferences bringing together Foreign Ministers, plus a number of
sectoral meetings between officers. Senior officials meet regularly in the Euro-
Mediterranean Committee, while Association Councils supervise the implemen-
tation of agreements.
To sustain these objectives, the EU disposes of a number of means. At a regional
level, the MEDA programme gives financial support to the goals of develop-
ment, economic reform and democratisation, total aid to the region amounting
to 5.35 billion for the period 2000-2006. Within the EIDHR, the MEDA-
Democracy Programme developed in 1996 is designed to grant financial support
to civil society members and public bodies with projects aiming to develop
democracy and the rule of law. Lastly, the newly envisaged European Neigh-
bourhood Policy aims to use existing tools such as MEDA until the next finan-
cial framework in 2006 to meet objectives for reform. After 2006, the creation
of a New Neighbourhood Policy Instrument will specifically target social and
economic reform.
40. Any assessment of EU efforts of reform is necessarily limited by the constitutional framework –
the EU can only do what it is constitutionally capable of doing, the more so because of its particu-
lar nature as an international actor. Thus, the EU’s ability to act is constrained by its institutional
framework, marked by its ‘dual decision-making’ processes and competences (intergovernmental
and supranational), which cut across the policy-areas (Common Foreign and Security Policy,
Trade, Development Aid and Security Policy) and prevent unitary action.
41. Karen E. Smith, ‘The use of political conditionality in the EU’s relations with third countries:
how effective?’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 1998:3, pp. 253-74.
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3.2 Assessing EU Efforts
Although consistent with theoretical developments and equipped with the nec-
essary instruments, EU democracy promotion policy in practice has been far
from comprehensive or satisfactory. The ambiguous nature of the aims behind
reform has translated into an inconsistent implementation which has ultimately
hindered effectiveness and credibility. Across the range of EU initiatives, such
‘double standards’ were manifest in the priority given to stability (effectively,
indulgence of limited reform carried out by authoritarian governments) over
genuine political reform, and in the support for institutional reform (the promo-
tion of ‘constitutionalism’) while at the same time opposing ‘substantive’
choices.
As the main institutional framework structuring relations with the Arab world,
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) is a case in point. Launched in 1995
in Barcelona in the wake of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, the EMP was
intended as a programme combining bilateral and regional cooperation to
address regional issues in an OSCE-like fashion, covering political/security, eco-
nomic and social/cultural baskets. The underlying concern was the promotion
of stability in the region; the unstated goal to prevent and control immigration
from entering Europe by bettering political, economic and social conditions.
The record of the three baskets is contrasted. The first basket (political and
security basket, based inter alia on principles of human rights and democracy)
has the great merit of being the one regional forum which brings together Arab
countries and Israel. However, it has achieved only modest results. By 2002,
projects implemented have amounted to the setting up of a network of foreign
policy research institutes and think tanks (known as EuroMeSco), diplomatic
seminars held twice a year in Malta bringing together senior and junior officials
from countries on both sides of the Mediterranean. The record of the cultural
basket is equally limited; despite its recent enhancement, most initiatives to date
have been largely elite-oriented.42 Notably, the introduction of the Valencia
‘Action Plan on Dialogue between cultures and civilizations’, focusing on youth,
education and the media, as well as the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Foun-
dation, have still to bear fruit. The second basket, traditionally the focus of
enhanced cooperation, has a better record. The conclusion of third generation
association agreements with all Med countries but one (Syria) and the move
towards deeper economic integration (launch of the Euromed Internal Market
42. R. Gillespie, ‘Reshaping the Agenda? The internal politics of the Barcelona process in after-
math of September 11’, in Mediterranean politics, vol 8, n.2-3, summer-autumn 2003, Special Issue
on ‘Euro-Mediterranean relations after September 11’.
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Programme, and advances towards the Euromed Free Trade Area) attested to a
steady progress.
Broadly, however, EU strategy has remained subjected to a number of inconsist-
encies. Political reform was not a high priority. European governments have
been highly indulgent of democratic shortfalls. Failure to systematically apply
punitive conditionality on political grounds contrasted significantly with EU
willingness to withhold aid packages where economic reforms were not under-
taken. The breaking off of association agreement talks with Algeria in 1997,
presented by the EU as a way of exerting pressure on the Algerian government
to reform, was turned on its head when talks resumed in 1999 – with political
conditions unchanged. Morocco and Jordan’s new sovereigns were given almost
unconditional support, whilst the tightening of pluralism in Egypt and Tunisia
met with no substantial response from the EU.43 Far from this, the allocation of
official development assistance (ODA) in the region not only reflected little con-
cern for political openness, but was manifestly conditional on economic
reform.
44 Such indulgence towards authoritarian governments in the region has
arguably been reinforced in the aftermath of September 11, as demonstrated by
the scant reaction of the Western world to the electoral triumph of Tunisian
president Ben Ali in October 2004 – and whose open disregard for human rights
is no secret.45 Direct aid to democracy projects was not only insufficient in
quantity, but was also narrow in scope, most aid being ‘bottom-up’ rather than
more politisized ‘top-down’. In line with the prevailing emphasis on good gov-
ernance, even aid classified as ‘political assistance’ related only indirectly to
democracy – most was aimed at small business development, environmental
associations and cultural cooperation.
In addition, such double standards as emerged in practice were enhanced by the
emphasis on economic reform at the heart of EMP. Underlying the latter was the
belief that economic modernization would automatically spill over into other
fields of reform and lead towards political liberalization and good governance.
Thus, funding for human rights and democracy projects received less funding
than family planning or drug eradication programmes, making up for 2% of
total European aid towards the region.46 Quite apart from the consideration
43. R. Youngs, ‘The EU and Democracy promotion in the Mediterranean: A New or Disingenuous
Strategy?’, in Gillespie and Youngs, p. 47.
44.  As shown by Tunisia’s success in securing a disproportionately high share of the MEDA funds
in 1999.
45. The headline of a newspaper article is revealing, « Tunisie: Les bonnes performances
économiques du pays et la lutte antiterroriste assurent au Président la clémence des pays
occidentaux », Le Monde, 23.10.2004.
46. R. Youngs, ‘The European Union and Democracy in the Arab-Muslim World’, Working Paper
No. 2, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, November 2002.
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that the relationship between economic liberalization and political reform has
proven empirically dubious,47 the emphasis on economic reform has arguably
been counterproductive to the extent that it has allowed unresolved political and
security issues to slow down economic progress.
48 More importantly, however,
such double standards were apparent in the EU’s insistence on a process of trade
liberalization which was strongly skewed to its own advantage – and specifically
manifest in the EU’s protectionism towards certain markets, such as agriculture
and textile, crucial to the Mediterranean partners.
The little attention devoted to political change was equally evident in frame-
works other than the EMP. EU relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC), articulated through the EU-GCC Cooperation Agreement signed in
1989, are focused on free trade issues and on cooperation in fighting terrorism
and non-proliferation. Dialogue on political reform is conspicuously absent,
while EU attempts to launch contacts on human rights issues have met with
resistance from the GCC partners. Similarly, progress of the EU’s Comprehen-
sive Dialogue with Iran, envisaging negotiations on political and economic
issues (currently absent), relate to Iran’s external relations – not to democratic
reform. Despite the introduction of a human rights dialogue in December 2002
on a prospective Trade and Cooperation Agreement, negotiations were largely
linked to progress on four areas: human rights, WMD, terrorism and the Middle
East Peace Process. Unsurprisingly, progress on a free trade agreement has been
stalled due to tensions between Iran and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) over nuclear proliferation.
In addition to privileging stability over reform, European approaches have also
been reluctant to support or engage with moderate Islamist elements, while
insisting on the general need for political reform. Apparent both at grass-roots
level and in institutions-oriented reform, such neglect of Islamist moderates
effectively amounts to ‘introducing European values and goals because of their
reputed democratic significance’.
49 Not only is this questionable from a norma-
tive point of view, but it has also contributed to reinforcing perceptions in the
Arab world that EU democracy promotion policies are a means of undermining
Islamic identity. Thus, European civil society support has largely revolved
around Western-style activist Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) rather
than local groups based around the mosque, neighbourhood groups or profes-
sional syndicates. Out of the 48 democratization projects funded by the MEDA
47. Again, Tunisia’s experience – notably the tightening of political pluralism in recent years –
shows that economic liberalization has not led to political reform.
48. R. Balfour, ‘Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue’, European
Union Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Papers No. 52, May 2004.
49. Op.cit. Aliboni and Guazzone, p. 88.
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Democracy Programme-Europe Aid for the period 1996-2001, 33 centered on
Morocco, while 15 others involved the country at a regional level. Of the 33 in
Morocco, only 9 went directly to national NGOs, 18 to international NGOs,
four were handled by governmental bodies and two were co-managed by
Moroccan and international NGOs.50 Another example of EU reluctance to
engage moderate Islamists is the absence of pressure to promote freedom of
association for Islamist non-violent associations. In Morocco, the impossibility
for some religious associations of establishing religious organizations or the lack
of official recognition makes them ineligible for EU funds. Similarly, there has
been no financial support to organizations which explicitly aim to introduce
serious institutional and constitutional reforms. As noted by an analyst,
“Despite the undoubted value of the bottom-up approach for countries
in which the legacy of authoritarian government rendered the construct-
ing of basic grass-roots democratic capacity particularly urgent, the EU’s
political aid could more accurately be classified as aimed at specific
human rights issues than at a comprehensive range of democracy assist-
ance projects.”51
Overall, EU policies have been subject to a number of contradictions and double
standards which have not only failed to induce significant political change in the
region, but (perhaps because of this) have also undermined EU credibility.
3.3 Rethinking Reform after 9/11
Against this background, and in the aftermath of 9/11, European governments
advanced a number of initiatives designed to address the limitations besetting
EU policies. Across the range of initiatives is an enhanced focus on human rights
and democracy, notably apparent in the Communication issued by the Commis-
sion on May 21, 2003 setting out the strategic guidelines for ‘Reinvigorating EU
action on human rights and democratization with Mediterranean Partners’.52
Policy recommendations included the establishment of a ‘systematic’ dialogue
on human rights issues, as well as that of a ‘technical’ subgroup for such ends.
In order to enhance EU knowledge on the human rights situation in the partner
countries and to ensure better coordination between the latter and the Commis-
sion, sources of information should be streamlined. Equally, workshops with
civil society, including at a regional level, should be created to better identify
50. S. Haddadi, ‘The EMP and Morocco: Diverging Political Agendas?’, in op.cit Jünemann, p. 73.
51. Op.cit. Gillespie and Youngs, p. 57.
52. COM(2003) 294 final, 21.06.2003.
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priorities for reform (to be integrated in the National Action Plans of the envis-
aged ENP).
Further confirmation of the enhanced emphasis on human rights and democracy
in the EU’s external relations is apparent in the European Security Strategy (ESS)
adopted in December 2003, as well as in the joint Commission-Council Secre-
tariat paper on strengthening relations with the Arab world, dated 4 December
2003. The former emphasised ‘spreading good governance, supporting social
and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing
the rule of law and protecting human rights’ as ‘the best means of strengthening
the international order’.53 The latter goes beyond the vague enunciation of prin-
ciples, suggesting that the combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches
needs to be strengthened through a ‘firm and frank’ political dialogue and by
identifying partners at different levels to build a dialogue with civil society.54
Indicative of the relative shift in policy, the European Neighbourhood Policy or
‘Wider Europe’ framework effectively builds on such principles.
The European Neighbourhood Policy initiated by the Commission in March
2003 is conceived as a post-enlargement strategy to deal with the EU’s neigh-
bours after 2004 and aimed at constructing a ‘friendly neighbourhood’.55 Essen-
tially, Wider Europe is designed as an alternative to enlargement for those coun-
tries that do not benefit from the prospect of EU membership. Thus, ‘in return
for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation
of political, economic and institutional reforms, including in aligning legislation
with the acquis, the EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of
closer economic integration with the EU… the prospect of a stake in the EU’s
internal market and further integration and liberalization to promote the free
movement of persons, goods, services and capital’.56
This carrot and stick exercise is backed by principles of conditionality and dif-
ferentiation. The former includes the setting out of political criteria, or ‘bench-
marks’, to be fulfilled through Action Plans on a country-by-country as well as
a regional basis. The combination of such developments has the potential to
enhance reform. Given the failure of the EMP to induce real political reform in
the region, benchmarks would allow for the exercise of a degree of positive
53. J. Solana, ‘A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy’, document adopted
at the European Council, Brussels, 12 December 2003.
54. Council Secretariat and European Commission, ‘Strengthening the EU’s Partnership with the
Arab world’, D(2003), 10318, Brussels, 4 December 2003.
55. European Commission, ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations
with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’, Commission Communication COM(2003), 104 final,
Brussels, 11 March 2003.
56. Ibid., p. 4.
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conditionality with which to stimulate reform. Differentiated cooperation
allows the EU to reward those partners who are making more progress, thus
giving a much needed impulse to the multilateral dimension of the EMP – now
practically reduced to bilateral cooperation.
57 In addition, the offer of new
incentives such as the ENP Instrument, effectively a new aid window, could
induce reform.
However, a credible implementation of such principles requires that the EU offer
concrete incentives and develop clear ‘benchmarks’ providing attainable and
measurable targets. The prospect of greater economic integration and human
mobility within the EU, two incentives addressed in the Action Plans, may pro-
vide a new impetus for reform. But while the Action Plans recently drafted by
the Commission arguably go in this direction, they fall short of granting genuine
concessions or incentives.58 Particularly with regard to the second basket, posi-
tive conditionality should aim to offer incentives in the field of the four freedoms
– concretely, this would mean greater liberalization in the fields of migration,
agriculture and textiles.
Although freedom of movement is high on the list of priorities for the target
states, it is only partially addressed in the Action plans for the Mediterranean
countries. Although aiming to facilitate the movement and integration of work-
ers and coordinate social security schemes, there are no concrete measures relat-
ing to the movement of young persons or students, an issue which has tradition-
ally hampered cooperation. In the case of Jordan and Morocco, the Commission
hints at the possibility of “[examining] the scope for visa facilitation for short
stay for some categories of persons to be defined jointly.”
59 Nor are there guide-
lines of any sort indicating what the procedures are to get into the visa-free list
of countries.
Incentives in the field of agriculture are also insufficient. Thus, while steps for
greater liberalization of trade in services are envisaged across the range of Med-
57. T. Schumacher, ‘Riding on the Winds of Change: The Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Part-
nership,’ The International Spectator, 2/2004. It has been argued that the rise of an ‘EMP of con-
centric circles’ would likely put an end to the comprehensive and holistic approach inherent to the
EMP. However, differentiated cooperation would not entail a redesigning of the three basket struc-
ture. Moreover, the Agadir Process, involving Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan, shows that dif-
ferentiation is to some extent already a reality. See E. Philippart, “A Critical Evaluation of an
Ambitious Scheme”, in European Foreign Affairs Review, 8:2, summer 2003.
58. The first action plans of the ENP have been approved by the Commission on 9/12/2004,
including Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authority for the Southern Mediter-
ranean countries, as well as Moldova and Ukraine.
59. http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/Proposed_Action_Plan_EU-Jor-
dan.pdf
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iterranean partners, similar measures in the field of agriculture are lacking. In
the case of Jordan, only the “possibility for further liberalization of trade in
agricultural products” is contemplated. In the case of Morocco, agricultural
reform is aimed at fostering conditions for the creation of a free trade area
between Morocco and the EU. However, most measures are aimed at the pro-
motion and exchange of information on agricultural policies, not explicitly at
liberalization.60 Added to this is the question of whether such offers in trade and
migration issues – although insufficient – should be conditioned specifically
within the sector concerned (within trade or visa policy) or should be attached
to the fulfilment of political standards of democracy and human rights.
Such little space for conditionality is compounded by limitations with respect to
the promotion of democracy and human rights as such. While the Strategy Plan
drafted by the Commission in May 2004 set out a number of political priori-
ties,61 such a commitment to the ‘strengthening of shared values’ has not been
fully translated into concrete measures in the Action Plans. Most Action Plans
refer to the need to enhance political dialogue and reform and broaden political
debate. In the case of Jordan, action will aim to establish a political dialogue
between the European Parliament and the Jordanian Parliament, as well as pro-
moting in the medium term a national dialogue on ‘democracy, political life and
relevant issues’. In this sense, the promotion of nation-wide political dialogue
differs significantly from the proposal of the Commission Communication on
‘Reinvigorating EU Actions on Human Rights and Democratization with Med-
iterranean Partners’, which called for the creation of a ‘technical level of dia-
logue below the political level’ with a view to enhancing human rights.62 How-
ever, the enhanced focus on political dialogue remains rather vague.
The focus on the broadening of political debate is also limited in scope. As in
previous initiatives, intensified political relations are envisaged at the level of
state institutions and with existing political actors. There is no explicit mention
of engaging with moderate Islamist sectors in civil society throughout the
region, which effectively limits the task of extending the discussion on democ-
racy nation-wide. As argued by Gillespie and Youngs, “what is essential here is
not only to build more bridges linking existing political actors…but to establish
networks of dialogue and cooperation that involve new actors as well’.
63 The
extension of debate about democracy to society at large would involve integrat-
60. http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/Proposed_Action_Plan_EU-
Moroco_FR.pdf
61. COM (2004) 373 final.
62. COM(2003) 294 final, 21.06.2003.
63. Gillespie and Youngs, ‘Democracy and the EMP: European and Arab Perspectives’, EuroMeSco
Brief, December 2003.
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ing non-governmental actors such as political reform campaigners, political sci-
entists, political commentators and party activists into such dialogues, and fund-
ing them on a consistent basis.
Despite the renewed emphasis on conditionality, EU efforts have not differed
significantly from earlier approaches; the commitment to reform so present in
discourse has only been translated into policy to a limited extent. Policy contin-
ues to suffer from a timid engagement with Islamist society and conditionality
is limited by the lack of real ‘carrots’. Not only is this counterproductive for
reform, but is also likely to undermine credibility in the eyes of Mediterranean
partners.
3.4 The transatlantic dimension: 
room for cooperation?
A fundamental aspect of European efforts of reform relates to the transatlantic
dimension of EU policy, to date practically negligible. In contrast to the plethora
of European programmes towards Arab reform, the only existing transatlantic
framework for political cooperation in the Middle East are NATO coordination
with regard to Afghanistan and the Quartet – the NATO Mediterranean Dia-
logue being of limited relevance in practice.
However, beyond the enduring debate about the nature of transatlantic rela-
tions, there is urgent need for cooperation and coordination in strategies for
reform. There are undoubtedly areas of friction between the US and EU rooted
in differences of approach. Europeans have traditionally denounced the strongly
instrumental view of democracy promotion advocated by the US, seeing politi-
cal reform as part of a broader process of social and economic modernization.
This is largely reflected in the discourse of EU policy by references to the ‘spread
of liberal values’, traditionally opposed to the US rhetoric of ‘regime change’,
and largely exacerbated by the rift over the Iraq war. In addition, Europeans fear
that association with the US might undermine their own efforts in the region due
to the former’s loss of credibility. The US’s poor image in the region is hardly an
advantage to assisting reform, to the extent that many regional NGOs refuse to
accept American funding on the grounds that it will undermine their local legit-
imacy.64 Finally, the suspicion among Europeans that a new initiative will sup-
plant efforts to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, long present in transatlantic rela-
tions, is a major point of divergence. US positions have tended to focus on con-
64. D. Dassa Kaye, ‘Mind the gap: the United States, Europe and the Middle East’, Clingendael
Netherlands Institute of International Relations, July 2004.
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tainment of the conflict, while Europeans have long argued that a fair solution
to the conflict and the attainment of peace is fundamental to long term stability.
However, there is also room for convergence. The past few years have witnessed
a rapprochement between US and EU positions on democracy promotion, par-
ticularly with the emergence of more multidimensional and incrementalist initi-
atives such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Broader
Middle East Initiative (BMEI). Launched in December 2002, the MEPI consists
of four central pillars: political reform, focused on the strengthening of demo-
cratic processes, particularly civil society, and support for fighting corruption
and improving parliamentary elections; economic reform – helping regional
countries’ competitiveness and privatisation processes, encouraging foreign
direct and domestic investment, helping small businesses grow; fighting illiter-
acy, building schools, educating girls, and introducing computer training, and
finally, enhancing the role of women in the region. Governance-oriented, the
programme has been criticised for its failure to alter the existing political order;
as termed by Carothers and Ottaway, the MEPI largely represents the ‘standard
template’ of democracy assistance.65
Although seemingly discarded, the recent Broader Middle East and North Africa
Initiative (BMEI), initiated at the June 2004 Group of Eight industrialized
nations (G8), essentially builds on these principles to launch a process encom-
passing political, social and economic reform. Although the contents did not
differ significantly from previous initiatives, the leaking of the programme
before the formal launch in June 2004 met with negative reactions from both
the Arab world and Europe. Europe expressed unease at what was perceived as
a grand initiative based more on American conceptions on the terrorist threat
than on regional needs – the ‘Broader Middle East’ covered Iran, Afghanistan
and Pakistan as well as countries in the Arab world. Across the latter, the new
programme was perceived as an attempt by the US to impose change on the
region, reinforced by the suspicion that it was none but an attempt to distract
attention from and avoid dealing with the Arab-Israeli peace process – not
addressed in the initial leaking of the new initiative. Lastly, the criticism was
voiced that, like its predecessor, the BMEI programmes did not adequately
address political institutions.
66
Despite the scepticism which it encountered, the BMEI presents a number of
positive aspects. Effectively offering a US-EU framework for democracy promo-
65. T. Carothers and M. Ottaway, ‘The Greater Middle East Initiative: Off to a False Start’, Carne-
gie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief No. 29, March 2004.
66. International Crisis Group, ‘The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: Imperilled at
Birth’, Middle East and North Africa Briefing, 7 June 2004.
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tion, it reflects a more cooperative approach – towards Europe and the G8 at
least – than in previous years, and has arguably given new impetus to European
approaches towards the region.67 Notwithstanding differences in approach and
suspicions on the EU side about US intentions, the BMEI could open a window
of opportunity for greater cooperation among the EU and the US. The new pro-
gramme also reflects a shift in thinking on the part of the Bush administration;
a growing awareness, in the wake of the Iraq war, that the struggle against ter-
rorism implies tackling the root causes of instability and not just imposing
‘regime change’. The new initiative thus comprises a number of political, eco-
nomic and social reform programmes in Arab countries. Among its major nov-
elties are the proposal for a new democracy fund and a regional forum for dia-
logue on reform – the ‘Forum for the Future’ – bringing together Western and
Arab governments, and Arab civil society groups. The extension of the dialogue
on democracy to representatives of civil society of the countries concerned is
thus meant to enhance the element of ownership, necessary in the face of the loss
of credibility by the West. However, it must be noted that the BMEI does not
seem to be a priority anymore, and it remains to be seen whether such high-
flown rhetoric will bear fruit in the coming months.
Lastly, transatlantic cooperation is also present in the framework of NATO’s
Mediterranean Dialogue. Launched in 1994, the Mediterranean Dialogue func-
tions as an institutionalised forum for discussion and exchange of views between
NATO members and seven Middle Eastern countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jor-
dan, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia). Aimed at promoting stability in the
region, the Dialogue has only achieved modest success in practice, due to reluc-
tance on both sides to intensify military and political cooperation.
68 Proposals
to revitalise the Dialogue at the NATO summit in Istanbul in June 2004 reflect
NATO’s willingness to play an increased role in the region, and include meas-
ures designed to upgrade the dialogue to a Partnership programme based on the
Partnership for Peace (PfP) experience. Enhanced political cooperation will
include an increase in the frequency of meetings and consultations, and the pro-
motion of a more flexible form of cooperation (NATO+n) which will allow
those partners willing to deepen cooperation to do so. Enhanced military coop-
eration will focus on areas where NATO has a comparative advantage with
respect to the EMP. In particular, cooperation on countering terrorism, informa-
tion sharing and border control; military to military cooperation and training;
defence reform and civilian and democratic control of armed forces.
67. Ibid. p. 11.
68. The lack of cooperation was partly due to NATO’s strategic focus on Central and Eastern
Europe, and to differences in interest between the seven dialogue countries, with Israel and Algeria
keen on intensifying military cooperation and Egypt and Morocco more sceptical.
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However, NATO’s proposals to enhance its Mediterranean Dialogue have met
with criticism on a number of fronts. Arguing that the Mediterranean Dialogue
can only play a limited role in Middle East reform, some analysts have posited
that NATO lacks the political and economic tools necessary to tackle the root
causes of instability in the Middle East, mainly internal in nature and demand-
ing long term economic progress and political reform. Importantly, intensified
cooperation on terrorism and defence reform could undermine the goal of
democratization and political reform, already weakened by increased govern-
ment repression in the aftermath of 9/11.
69 In addition, a Partnership for Peace
built on the model applied to Central and Eastern Europe might also create
unrealistic expectations such as eventual NATO membership, which the US and
EU may not necessarily wish.70
69. H. Malmvig, ‘From Diplomatic Talkshop to Powerful Partnership? NATO’s Mediterranean
Dialogue and the democratisation of the Middle East’, DIIS Brief, Danish Institute for Interna-
tional Relations, May 2004.
70. V. Perthes, ‘America’s “Greater Middle East” and Europe: Key Issues for Dialogue’, Middle
East Policy, 11:3, Fall 2004.
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4. Enhancing reform: 
the coherence of policies
The notion of ‘comprehensive security’ underlying EU policies, from the EMP
to Wider Europe and the European Security Strategy, provides an appropriate
framework to tackle the political problems of the region. Not only does it reflect
the EU’s civilian tradition of foreign policy making and its capabilities in exter-
nal relations – notwithstanding the evolution of the ESDP and the value of
potential cooperation with NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. It is also better
suited to deal with the complex nature of the security challenges that emanate
from the region, where economic underdevelopment, poverty, demographic
growth, illiteracy and marginalization of women combine with authori-
tarianism to breed social and political discontent. However, EU policies suffer
from a number of shortfalls which have undermined their effectiveness to carry
out reform, and which need to be addressed in future policy. The challenge for
EU policy is to move towards a greater degree of coherence which will allow it
to attain the gradualism which informs its policies. This involves, on the one
hand, an attempt to separate democracy promotion from broader human rights
promotion, and on the other, complementing top-down and bottom-up
approaches. In addition, EU policy must integrate a transatlantic dimension cru-
cial to enhancing reform.
4.1 Within EU frameworks
EU policies have been marked in recent years by a confusion of democracy pro-
motion with human rights promotion, largely due to the conflation of policy
objectives under the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights.
From an EU policy perspective, this has translated into policy focusing on those
countries experiencing bad human rights situations to the detriment of those
showing some commitment to political reform. It has also translated into limited
political aid, in scale and scope. In addition, it has also led to discrepancies
within the EU, resulting in a variety of initiatives at the national level which lack
coordination at the level of strategy and implementation.
71 From an Arab per-
spective, such confusion has often resulted in rejection by Arab governments of
EU attempts to reform, dismissing Western models of democracy as too secular.
71. Examples are Germany’s Task Force for Dialogue with the Islamic World and the UK’s Global
Opportunity Fund for engaging with the Islamic World.
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Against this background, commitments to political reform would benefit from
a decoupling of the democracy and human rights agendas and a specific focus
on the former. EU policy should aim to expand political participation to broader
sections of society and public opinion, in particular with regard to the Islamist
dimension of Arab civil society. This implies engaging with new actors such as
party activists, political commentators and reform campaigners in dialogue and
cooperation. Given the diversity of views that has emerged across the Islamist
movement in recent years, and the strong presence of moderate Islamist forces
in Arab countries, engaging with moderate Islamists is fundamental to a legiti-
mate process of political and social reform. EU policies should thus aim to fund
pro-democratic Islamic forces. This implies the creation of institutionalised dia-
logue with those moderate Islamist forces (political parties and/or opposition
groups) that have proclaimed acceptance of democratic and pluralist principles.
Examples could include the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan, al-
Nahda in Tunisia, the PJD and al-‘Adl wa-l-Ihsan in Morocco. Clearly, the
degree of ‘moderation’ differs from one group to the other; although ‘moderate’,
each party has its own discourse and position depending on their relationship
vis-à-vis incumbent regimes. Priority should thus be given to exploring the
nature of the Islamist movement, currently under-researched. Western policies
could also explore various ways in which to link economic aid to such groups
to political reform. Engaging moderate Islamism in the reform process also
entails increasing support for grass-roots Islamist welfare organisations which
enjoy widespread credibility among the population. This would help to establish
trust between European donors and Islamists, which could then be harnessed to
encourage debate on more political issues.
However, it has been observed that establishing a dialogue with Islamist main-
stream would require using a concept of democracy that is less value-laden than
the one currently in use.72 Arguably, the EU approach to democracy promotion
is not limited to the creation of political institutions but includes a social and
cultural dimension as well. This has led Southern Mediterranean partners to
perceive Western reform efforts as interventionist and intrusive. Since it is obvi-
ous that a European model of democracy is not likely to flourish in the Arab
world overnight, and given that Arab societies and governments are increasingly
sensitive to what is perceived as Western intervention, EU efforts should pro-
mote concepts that are less Western value-laden but contribute to the establish-
ment of the formal structures of democracy. Emphasis should thus be laid on
fundamental rights and freedoms such as freedom of the press, association and
rights of women, political party-building and institution-building. In this sense,
72. Op. cit. Aliboni, ‘Promoting Democracy in the EMP. Which Political Strategy?’, EuroMeSco
Report, Working Group I, Third Year Report, November 2004.
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the concept of the rule of law may come prior to the concept of democracy itself.
This also implies that if Arab peoples wish to choose a legal order that is based
on shari’a as the first source of law, they should be able to do so and the EU
should be willing to accept this.
Broadening the debate on reform to new actors is not and should not lead to
underplay action on governments, where leverage can be effectively used. The
ENP has reinforced the use of conditionality in its relations with Arab countries,
but the degree to which this commitment shall be implemented remains to be
seen. In any case, the EU should make better use of the language it uses to
encourage or denounce violations of democratic standards. It should compli-
ment Arab states that have shown more commitment to democratic reforms
(such as Morocco) and steadily denounce those governments which deviate
from democratic commitments. As captured by one analyst, such actions will
not change Arab regimes overnight, and will likely antagonize some, but they
would ‘add a new calculation to Arab governments’ decision making [the reac-
tion of the EU]’.
73 Also, the EU should broaden the scope of its funding to
include issues such as political party building, civil-military relations and auton-
omous parliamentary capabilities, today virtually non-existent. One analyst has
advocated the creation of a European Initiative for Middle East Reform, bring-
ing together EU donors and specifically aimed at promoting democracy, increas-
ing both the coordination of different initiatives and the visibility of European
efforts.74
In addition to broadening debate to include new actors, the EU needs to com-
plement such actions with a firm and systematic use of political conditionality.
Given the importance the Arab partners attach to economic development over
political and security issues, emphasis should be laid on reinforcing the link
between economic and political objectives embodied in EU policy. Positive con-
ditionality should thus rest on offering trade incentives in a number of areas to
compensate for the negative effects of harmonising internal legislation. In par-
ticular, EU policy should aim to increase the degree of liberalization in key areas
such as agriculture and migration, for years the litmus test of Western willing-
ness to engage in partnerships. This will not only reinforce EU credibility in the
Arab countries, but will also make dialogue more acceptable to them. Cooper-
ation in the field of migration, today reduced to the prospect of examining the
scope of visa facilitation, could be used as a powerful incentive for reform. One
analyst has suggested that a common visa regime be established for the Mediter-
73. A. Hawthorne, ‘Can the US promote democracy in the Middle East?’, Current History, January
2003.
74. R. Youngs, ‘European Policies for Middle East Reform: a Ten Point Action Plan’, The Foreign
Policy Centre, Civility Programme, 2004.
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ranean partners, while other proposals have revolved around a series of ‘quick
start’ packages of visa facilitation measures for certain applicants like students
or academics.75 However, it should be noted that greater incentives in the field
of migration and border control, currently tied to the Justice and Home Affairs
agenda, should be tailored in a way that they do not impinge on reform efforts,
as is increasingly happening in the post 9/11 period. The amount of aid allocated
to civil society and human rights projects has been noticeably less than that
invested in anti-migration controls and security cooperation with Mediterra-
nean regimes. Such an imbalance may affect the effectiveness of policies aimed
at fostering respect for democratic values.
In general, the EU should develop conditions linked to political reforms that are
attainable. While the newly released Commission Action Plans within the ENP
go in this direction, there have been no systematic efforts to link conditionality
to particular programmes. As one analyst notes, the aim should be to promote
institutional change to allow for greater autonomy in the area of work of each
individual EU aid project.
76 Thus, funds for economic restructuring, currently
channelled through ministries, could be conditioned on greater autonomy in the
management of projects by private sector organisations. Lastly, negative condi-
tionality should be envisaged, in case such conditions are not met. Although it
is widely accepted that radical use of conditionality can be counter-productive,
it is also acknowledged that some kind of firm pressure is often necessary to
push for reform. Such pressure should however be applied incrementally and
equally among partners to avoid accusations of double standards.
4.2 A transatlantic dimension of EU policy?
The integration of a transatlantic dimension in EU policy is essential to coordi-
nate efforts of reform. This is justified not only due to the existence of shared
interests in the region, but also out of a danger of Arab states playing the US and
the EU off against each other, as has been the case with Syria. Recent develop-
ments are in this perspective a step forward; the G8 summit and joint EU-US
declarations reflect the growing willingness to cooperate, at least at a regional
level.
75. For the former, see op. cit. Schumacher, p. 97; for the latter, M. Emerson, ‘The European
Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy or Placebo?, Centre for European Policy Studies, Working Docu-
ment No. 215, November 2004.
76. Op.cit. Youngs, ‘Western policies for Middle East Reform’, p. 18.
academia-egmont.papers.8.book  Page 34  Thursday, May 19, 2005  3:48 PMARAB REFORM: WHAT ROLE FOR THE EU?
35
However, with respect to the promotion of political and economic reform at an
internal level, and given the differences in approach and the instruments in
place, EU and US policies should aim to complement each other while remaining
distinct.
77 EU policies could effectively lose credibility more than they could gain
from too close an association – even at the level of perception – with US policies
in the region, particularly in the context of the widespread discredit of US action
in the Middle East due to the human rights abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison and
Guantanamo. As one expert notes, “It is hard to see how the United States can
push for a largely domestic-reform-oriented Greater Middle East Initiative –
women’s rights, civil society and political empowerment – at the same time that
most citizens and leaders in the region view the US as denying those very values
in its occupation practices in Iraq… And it would be very difficult for EU policy
makers to launch joint programmes with the US for the promotion of human
rights or the rule of law in Arab and other Middle Eastern states as long as the
US maintains its detention practices in Guantanamo.”78
Nevertheless, a degree of cooperation is necessary at a regional level. The crea-
tion of a regional forum for EU-US cooperation specifically focussed on Middle
East reform, suggested elsewhere, would help identify ways of moving forward
and dispel misunderstandings across both sides of the Atlantic. More impor-
tantly, however, cooperation is necessary to solve the geopolitical conflicts
across the region and create the conditions conductive to democracy. It is
accepted that the failure of the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) has triggered
Arab nationalism and provided a pretext for Arab regimes to defer reform by
holding on to political and economic power. Any attempt to push for reform in
the region must therefore include an explicit reference to the resolution of the
Arab-Israeli conflict as a condition for successful reform – and not merely try to
achieve progress despite the conflict, as is embedded in the ESS.
4.3 Toward a rethinking of current frameworks?
Attempts to enhance reform and revitalise existing structures have not prevented
the emergence of discussions on a possible restructuring of frameworks towards
the region. EU efforts in general have been marked by a lack of overall coordi-
nation which has weakened their effectiveness and coherence. Linkages between
Brussels departments and between different partnerships regulating EU relations
with the Arab world and Middle East are poor, undermining a coherent use of
77. As suggested in the ‘EU Interim report on an EU strategic partnership with the Mediterranean
and the Middle East’, March 2004.
78. Op.cit. V. Perthes, p. 97.
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policy instruments at their disposal. In addition, the sheer number of initiatives
and budgets on democracy and human rights has clouded visibility and further
weakened coherence. At a substantive level, EU policy towards the region con-
tinues to be marked by a comprehensive, gradual approach to political reform
which, while adequately suited to deal with the nature of the challenges beset-
ting the region, needs to be complemented by a better and more coherent use of
top-down approaches.
At the level of scope, debate has focused on the possible restructuring of the
EMP. Some believe that Barcelona remains the most appropriate framework to
address reform, arguing that the problems that have undermined its effective-
ness in the past relate more to a lack of political will than to any structural
problem.
79 The view underlying such arguments is that Barcelona is essentially
the expression of Europe’s soft power and that this structure has taken on stra-
tegic importance as the Middle East has become strategically significant to Euro-
pean security. Ultimately, the achievements of the Barcelona process have been
underestimated, it is argued, and efforts should focus on revitalising it – not
substituting it – to enhance reform.
Others have countered that the narrow geographic scope of the Barcelona proc-
ess is not sufficient to deal with the challenges emanating from the region. The
prospect of Turkish accession (recently approved by the Council in its December
summit) to the EU is likely to have important effects on the geopolitical balance
of the EMP, leaving Israel as the only non-Arab Mediterranean partner with
eight Arab countries – which, given the virtual demise of the Middle East Peace
Process, will likely undermine Israel’s chances of involvement in the EMP’s mul-
tilateral mechanism. Exposure to the new neighbourhood in the Middle East
(with Syria, Iran and Iraq as the EU’s neighbours in an area marked by instabil-
ity and conflict) will likely emphasise the need to go beyond relations based on
trade and political dialogue. In the light of such eventualities, some authors have
suggested transforming the EMP’s geographic scope into a more inclusive and
flexible ‘Euro-Middle East Partnership’.80 Such a structure would imply rede-
signing the EMP into an intergovernmental framework with the EMP at its cen-
tre, allowing for differentiated cooperation among the EU and its partners and
among the partners themselves. Others have advocated the creation of an ‘EU-
79. Op.cit. Jünemann; Martin Ortega, ‘Partners and neighbours: a CFSP for a Wider Europe’,
Chaillot Paper 64, EU Institute for Security Studies, September 2003.
80. T. Schumacher, ‘Riding on the wings of change: the future of the EMP’, The International Spec-
tator, 2/2004; F. Neugart and T. Schumacher, ‘Thinking about the EU’s Future Neighbourhood Pol-
icy in the Middle East: From the Barcelona Process to a Euro-Middle East Partnership’, in C. P.
Hanelt, G. Luciani and F. Neugart (eds.), Regime Change in Iraq, Florence: RSCAS Press, 2004.
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Middle East Contract for Democracy’, covering the wider Middle East and
focusing specifically on political reform.81
While discussion on the possible upgrading of EU frameworks would be cer-
tainly useful in a long-term perspective, giving EU policy greater clarity and
coherence, it is arguably too ambitious an initiative in the short and medium-
term. Apart from the fact that Maghreb countries have political dynamics that
are distinctive from those in countries such as Iran and the Gulf Cooperation
Countries (GCC) – let alone Iraq’s particular post-conflict reconstruction pre-
dicament – such broad initiatives also tend to ignore regional context, and in
particular, the effects the absence of peace in the Middle East is having on Arab
willingness to reform. At the risk of stating the obvious, it is important to note
that while reform is a worthy goal in itself, no progress will be achieved unless
a lasting peace to the conflict is found. Current efforts to resume talks on
reform, including those which were hailed as novel and responding to the chal-
lenge of engaging with ‘the other side of the Islamist movement’,82 have been
clearly undermined by the lack of prospects for peace. The Forum for the Future
recently established by the GMEI and meeting in Morocco on 12 December
2004 has been marked by divisions on the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict.83
Efforts should thus concentrate in the short term on resolving the conflict par-
allel to engaging with reform within established frameworks.
81. Op.cit Youngs, ‘A Ten point Action Plan’, p. 34.
82. Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid, ‘The Other Face of the Islamist Movement’, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, Working Paper No. 33, January 2003.
83. With US Secretary of State Colin Powell asserting that reform cannot await peace and Arab
governments reaffirming the need to find a lasting peace as a precondition for reform. El Pais, 12
December 2004.
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Conclusion
Reform in the Arab world is as a long-term process which must come from
within. This is not to say that democracy promotion efforts are not necessary –
on the contrary, external actors can and must help from the outside. But policies
for reform require cooperative, sustainable and comprehensive strategies; while
comprehensive, EU policy continues to suffer from a number of shortcomings.
Amongst these are the lack of an overall strategy to engage with moderate Islam-
ist sectors of Arab societies, and a disproportionate emphasis on bottom-up
approaches to reform. At a regional level, the time is not ripe for ‘grand’ initia-
tives. The United States and, to a lesser extent, European actions and credibility
have been severely undermined by the invasion and occupation of Iraq, inaction
towards growing violence in the Arab-Israeli conflict and indulgence towards
Israeli incursions.
The EU should thus focus on the implementation of Wider Europe, attempting
to strengthen relations with the Mediterranean countries as a first step towards
extending relations in the region. Partnership with the countries of the ‘Wider
Middle East’ should thus be envisaged in the long term, with the MEPP under
way and Western credibility restored. Moving towards greater partnership in
the short term would be politically costly, and feed into the suspicion that such
grand schemes are none but a way of diverting attention from the Middle East
conflict and Iraq, still the focus of resentment in the Arab world. With regard to
transatlantic cooperation, joint EU-US cooperation on reform is certainly neces-
sary and feasible, but should be subordinated to the strengthening of efforts to
resolve the conflict. Reengagement on peace is a high priority, and one that for
the vast majority of Arabs transcends foreign policy and has become a deeply
personal matter, a standard by which all else is judged.84
Irene MENENDEZ GONZALEZ
84. Op.cit. Chris Patten, citing the findings of a Zogby poll commissioned in 2002 by the Arab
Thought Foundation.
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